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ABSTRACT
In recent years, institutional investors have increasingly come to dominate the market
for publicly-traded stock. Mutual funds have become especially important, controlling
trillions of dollars of corporate equity.
The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) has made it clear
that it is the fiduciary responsibility of fund administrators to vote their shares in a
manner that benefits investors in the fund. Sponsoring companies have responded by
creating centralized research offices that determine the voting policies across all the
funds they administer. Though there may be some variation at the individual fund
level, most fund families vote as a block.
The practice of centralized voting raises the question whether each fund is promoting
the best interests of its investors. For example, one fund may hold stock in an acquisition target, while another holds stock in the acquirer; one fund may hold stock in a
target, while another holds debt. These funds have different interests, but voting policies rarely differentiate among them.
This Essay argues that mutual fund boards should develop procedures to ensure that
fund shares are voted with a view toward advancing the best interests of that particular
fund. If such procedures cannot be implemented in a manner that justifies their costs,
funds should refrain from voting their shares at all.
In addition to benefitting fund investors, this proposal may also have a salutary effect on portfolio firms. In recent years, commenters have expressed concern about
the voting power exerted by mutual fund managers, who may pressure firms to avoid
competition within an industry or who may encourage short-term financial engineering
over long-term growth. Decentralization may diminish asset managers’ power, thereby
alleviating these effects.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Mutual funds have dramatically changed the way that Americans
invest. In 1998, registered investment companies controlled $5.8 trillion
in assets; today, that figure has reached nearly $20 trillion.1 In 1980,
three percent of American households’ financial assets were invested in
mutual funds; today, mutual funds hold twenty-two percent of household financial assets.2 Ninety-four million U.S. individual investors own
mutual funds, either directly or through a retirement account, representing nearly forty-four percent of all U.S. households.3
Though there are thousands of mutual funds and investment
managers registered with the SEC,4 the industry is in fact dominated by
financial conglomerates that may each sponsor hundreds of funds, representing trillions of dollars in assets under control of a single umbrella
manager.5 Conflicts among client funds are both inevitable and ubiquitous, resulting in a variety of regulatory responses. Chief among these
are the basic fiduciary duties that each investment adviser and mutual
fund board of directors owes to the fund: the duties of care and loyalty.6
The SEC has also promulgated a number of specific rules aimed at enInv. Co. Inst., 2017 Investment Company Fact Book 9 (57th ed. 2017) [hereinafter
“ICI Fact Book”].
1

2

ICI Fact Book, supra note 1, at 11.

3

ICI Fact Book, supra note 1, at 112.

Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Structure of Investment Management Regulation, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON MUTUAL FUNDS (John D. Morley & William A. Birdthistle, eds.) (Elgar
Publishing, forthcoming) (reporting 11,500 SEC-registered investment managers as of
January 2015); ICI Fact Book, supra note 1, at 16, 22 (reporting 850 sponsors and over
16 thousand registered investment companies as of 2016).
4

See, e.g., Sarah Krouse, ‘Passive’ Investing Frenzy Pushes Vanguard to $4.7 Trillion in Assets,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2017, 5:33 PM), http://www.wsj.com/amp/ articles/passiveinvesting-frenzy-pushes-vanguard-to-4-7-trillion-in-assets-1507671188; see also BlackRock Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Feb. 28, 2017) (reporting $5.1 trillion in assets under management).
5

See Investment Company Governance, Exchange Act Release No. IC-26520 (July 27,
2004) (“the paramount principle that must prevail, and should animate all decisions
directors are called upon to make, is that a fund must be managed on behalf of its investors”).
6
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suring that advisers develop investment policies and execute orders in a
manner that advances the fund’s best interests.
What has received less attention is conflicts among funds when it
comes to voting. Mutual funds that hold equity investments are entitled
to vote their shares, but funds may stand on opposite sides of a merger,
hold investments in competing companies, or have different time horizons for their investments. As a result, they are likely to have varying
preferences. Notwithstanding this fact, it is common for advisers to centralize and coordinate their voting decisions. The practice is well known
and, indeed, publicized, but has attracted little regulatory attention despite the fact that in many instances, votes may be cast in a way that does
not advance—and indeed may harm—individual fund interests.
The issue takes on a particular significance given the extraordinary voting power exercised by mutual fund families. As one commenter explained, “When one looks at the shareholder registry of a typical
company, there are six names that come up repeatedly. These are
Blackrock, Vanguard, State Street, Fidelity, BNY Mellon Investment
Management and Capital Group.”7 The dominance of a handful of asset
managers has been described as “a concentration of corporate ownership, not seen since the days of J.P. Morgan and J.D. Rockefeller.”8 Coordination among funds dramatically increases each asset manager’s leverage, with all of the benefits to portfolio companies—as well as pitfalls—that follow.
As a result, this Essay argues that the common practice of coordinated voting among mutual fund families should be reconsidered.
Fund boards should carefully examine whether funds are served by adhering to a centralized governance strategy, and, if not, insist that individual funds vote their shares separately. In some cases, fund boards
may conclude that without centralization, it is not cost-effective to vote a
particular fund’s shares at all; if so, abstaining would be preferable to
Patrick Jahnke, Voice versus Exit: The causes and consequence of increasing shareholder concentration 9 (Sept. 18, 2017), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=3027058.
7

Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden power of the Big Three?: Passive index funds, re-concentration of corporate ownership, and new financial risk, 19 BUS. & POL. 298, 315 (2017).
8
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causing the fund to cast votes that do not advance the fund’s interests.
These changes will improve fund administration, ensure that votes are
cast in a manner that better reflects investors’ interests, and potentially
eliminate some of the pathologies that have resulted from the new concentration of stock ownership among a handful of asset managers.
II. MUTUAL FUNDS AND REGULATION OF CONFLICTS

Mutual funds are shell companies, usually organized as trusts under either Delaware or Massachusetts law, or as corporations under Maryland law.9 They have no operations or functions other than to hold a
basket of securities under professional management.10 Each fund has a
board of directors or board of trustees, whose main responsibility is to
hire and oversee an adviser who directs the fund’s investment strategy
and oversees its administrative operations.11 Investors buy shares in the
shell, and thereby indirectly gain exposure to a pro rata share of the securities held by the fund.12
A fund is established by a sponsoring firm. The firm selects the
initial board of directors, which is then expected to contract with the
sponsor to provide the fund with the necessary investment advice and
management services for a fee paid out of fund assets.13 These arrangements are rife with conflict and opportunity for predation; the board
does not have a meaningful opportunity to select a different investment
adviser,14 so there can be no serious haggling over fees and the scope of

Deborah A. DeMott, Fiduciary Contours: perspectives on mutual funds and private funds, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MUTUAL FUNDS (William A. Birdthistle & John D. Morley
eds.) (Edward Elgar Publishing, forthcoming).

9

10 Jennifer S. Taub, Able but Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisers to Advocate for
Shareholders’ Rights, 34 IOWA J. CORP. L. 101, 107 (2009).
11

See id.

12

See id. at 101, 106–07 (2009).

See John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee
Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 84, 93–94 (2010).
13

14

Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 481 (1979).
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services provided.15 Moreover, fund investors are often unsophisticated,
and may be steered to a particular fund by their brokers, who are compensated by the sponsor out of fund assets.16 All manner of abuse is
possible, from inflated fees to an investment portfolio designed to advance the interests of the sponsor rather than the interests of fund investors.17
The legal system addresses these conflicts in various ways. First
and most importantly, in 1940, Congress passed the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA)18 and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (IAA).19
In addition to imposing numerous requirements on mutual funds regarding, among other things, disclosure,20 diversification,21 liquidity,22 valuation,23 and related-party transactions,24 these statutes and their implementing regulations mandate that the board of each fund include a majority of “independent” directors, i.e., directors who have no material
relationship with the sponsoring firm.25 Independent directors have
Alan R. Palmiter, Mutual Fund Boards: A Failed Experiment in Regulatory Outsourcing, 1
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 161, 169 (2006).
15

Benjamin P. Edwards, Conflicts & Capital Allocation, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (2017). The
Department of Labor’s controversial fiduciary rule was adopted to address some of
these concerns. See Daisy Maxey, Investing in Funds & ETFs: A Quarterly Analysis – The
ABCs (and T's and Z's) of the Fiduciary Rule, WALL ST. J., July 10, 2017, at R1.
16

17

Taub, supra note 10, at 115 (2009).

18

15 U.S.C. §80a-1 et seq.

19

15 U.S.C. §80b-1 et seq.

LOIS YUROW ET AL., MUTUAL FUNDS REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK
§§ 12:2, 27:2 (2017).

20

John Morley, Collective Branding and the Origins of Investment Fund Regulation, 6 VA. L. &
BUS. REV. 341 (2012).
21

22

YUROW, supra note 20, at § 16:4.

23

YUROW, supra note 20, at § 14:1.

24

15 U.S.C. § 80a-17; 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(f).

The ICA requires only that boards be forty percent independent, see 15 U.S.C. §80a10(a), but in 2001, the SEC promulgated a rule requiring that funds seeking certain
specified regulatory exemptions maintain majority independent boards. Most funds
have voluntarily chosen to take advantage of these exemptions. Thomas A. Bausch et
25
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been described as the “cornerstone of the ICA’s effort to control conflicts of interest” who serve as “independent watchdogs” to protect the
interests of fund investors.26 As such, their most important responsibilities are to approve the investment adviser’s contract, including its fee,27
and to evaluate the quality of the fund’s management.28
Fund directors and advisors also have fiduciary duties to each
fund they administer under the ICA and IAA, and the law of the organizing state, namely, the duties of care and loyalty.29 The duty of care requires that the fiduciary “exercise the judgment and care that a prudent
person would exercise in the management of his or her own affairs.”30
The duty of loyalty requires that the fiduciary “resolve all conflicts of
interest in favor of the beneficiary and to devote its full energies toward
enhancing the beneficiary’s interest.”31 Many funds are also offered as

al., Creating an Effective, Functioning and Legally Compliant Mutual Fund Board, 22 THE INLAWYER 1 (2015); Role of Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 33-7932 Investment Company Act Rel. No. 24816 (Jan.
2, 2001).
VESTMENT

26

Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 482–84 (1979).

27

15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c).

28

See SEC Release No. IC-26520 (July 27, 2004).

Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2006); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963); Morris v. Wachovia Sec., Inc., 277 F.
Supp. 2d 622, 644 (E.D. Va. 2003); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Proxy Voting
by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003); Disclosure of Proxy Voting
Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 2003 WL 215451 (Jan. 31, 2003); Role of Independent
Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 33-7932 Investment
Company Act Rel. No. 24816 (Jan. 2, 2001); SEC Release No. IC-26520 (July 27, 2004).
29

DIV. OF CORP. FIN., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STAFF REPORT ON CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY: A RE-EXAMINATION OF RULES RELATING TO SHAREHOLDER
COMMUNICATIONS, SHAREHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN THE CORPORATE ELECTORAL
PROCESS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE GENERALLY (Sept. 4, 1980) (printed for the
use of S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.) [hereinafter “STAFF REPORT”].
30

31

STAFF REPORT, supra note 30, at 391.
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part of an ERISA-regulated retirement plan, with similar fiduciary obligations imposed.32
Yet, despite this extensive regulatory framework, the conflicts
under which funds labor remain an intractable fact of the industry. Fee
structures may be exploitative.33 Sponsors may be part of larger financial conglomerates, and their interests in promoting other lines of business may conflict with fund interests.34
More fundamentally, most mutual funds exist as part of a family
or complex of funds, all sponsored by a single asset manager, and each
with its own investment strategy, such as a focus on achieving particular
investment goals, or a focus on particular market segments. Because the
largest asset managers may offer hundreds of individual funds,35 conflicts
are pervasive; at every level, the fund adviser must decide how to allocate
resources.36 As John Morley and Allen Ferrell put it, “Every time a manager assigns an employee to serve one client, decides the order in which
to execute trades, . . . the manager is facing a conflict of interest. Even
the allocation of computer equipment and office space involves a conflict among clients.”37 In resolving these conflicts, there is strong evidence that advisers favor some funds over others by, among other
Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written
Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 FR
95879-01, 2016 WL 7453352.
32

Edwards, supra note 16, at 19–20 (2017); K.J. Martijn Cremers & Quinn Curtis, Do
Mutual Fund Investors Get What They Pay For? Securities Law and Closet Index Funds, 11 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 31 (2016).
33

For example, asset managers might direct funds to buy shares in offerings by an associated underwriter. Taub, supra note 10, at 115–116.
34

Fichtner et al., supra note 8, at 307 (BlackRock offers over 200 funds); John Morley,
The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation,
123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1232 (2014) (Fidelity offers several dozen funds).
35

Allen Ferrell & John Morley, New Special Study of the Securities Markets: Intermediaries,
http://www.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/capital-markets/ferrellmorley-final_draft.pdf; John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of
Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228, 1263 (2014).
36

37

Ferrell & Morley, supra note 36.
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things, assigning them more portfolio managers,38 hot IPO allocations,39
or the favorable side of market trades.40 In so doing, sponsors may seek
to boost funds that charge higher fees.41 Goosing the performance of
these funds attracts greater investment to them, which more than counterbalances any losses in lower-fee funds.42 Moreover, investors tend to
gravitate toward particular fund families, creating incentives for sponsors
to artificially create “star performers” who attract investors’ attention.43
These conflicts are exacerbated by the nearly universal practice of
using a single board, or clusters of boards, to oversee all funds in a family.44 Though the practice has frequently been challenged on the ground
that these overboarded directors cannot devote sufficient attention to the
individual funds whose interests they are obliged to protect—and high
salaries compromise nominally “independent” directors45—asset managers have long maintained that funds often face similar issues, and service
on multiple boards “may actually give directors greater leverage when
dealing with the common adviser.”46 Both courts and the SEC have accepted the funds’ position, and have rejected the claim that service on
multiple boards undermines directors’ independence.47
Ilan Guedj & Jannette Papastaikoudi, Can Mutual Fund Families Affect the Performance of
Their Funds?
38

Jose-Miguel Gaspar et al., Favoritism in Mutual Fund Families? Evidence on Strategic CrossFund Subsidization, 61 J. FIN. 73 (2006).
39

40

Id.

41

Id. at 76.

42

Id. at 102.

43

Id.

44

Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

Palmiter, supra note 15; James Sterngold, On Board, at a Mutual Fund, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 3, 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/on-board-at-a-mutual-fund-1409757187;
James Sterngold, Is Your Fund's Board Watching Out for You?, WALL ST. J., June 9, 2012,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303753904577450243418998540;
Palmiter, supra note 15.
45

46

Investment Company Governance, 69 FR 3472-01, 2004 WL 101604.

47

See, e.g., Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Intern., Inc., 248 F.3d 321 (4th Cir. 2001).
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At the same time, the SEC is aware of the potential for interfund
conflict, and has responded with regulations that target specific points of
concern.48 The landscape is very different when it comes to fund voting,
however. In that context, the SEC has been slow to consider conflicts
between the funds and their sponsors and has been unconcerned with—
and perhaps even encouraged—conflicts among funds managed by a
single adviser.
III.

MUTUAL FUNDS AND REGULATION OF VOTING

For many years, mutual fund regulation focused on funds’ fees,
disclosure practices, and selection of investments, with little attention
paid to funds’ involvement in the governance of their portfolio companies.49 Matters began to change in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as
stock became increasingly concentrated in the hands of institutional investors for the ultimate benefit of other persons, such as retirees and
employees. These institutions’ holdings were so large that the traditional
mechanism for expressing disapproval of management—exit—became
impractical in many instances; at the same time, the new corporate responsibility movements, along with the popularity of shareholder proposals, complicated matters on which shareholders were expected to
vote.50
In 1980, the SEC staff issued a report on institutional involvement in corporate governance.51 Though the report did not focus on
mutual funds specifically, it articulated the principle that institutional investors’ fiduciary duties of care and loyalty extended to the exercise of
the stockholder franchise.52 The staff made clear that institutions had a
“duty to vote in such a way as to promote the interests of the beneficiar17 C.F.R. 270.17d-1 (2013); 17 C.F.R. 270.17a-7 (2005); 17 C.F.R. 270.10f-3 (2016);
see also John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014) (characterizing SEC approach as “ad
hoc”).
48

49

Palmiter, supra note 15.

50

STAFF REPORT, supra note 30.

51

Investment Company Governance, 69 FR 3472-01, 2004 WL 101604.

52

Id.
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ies,”53 and concluded that “an institutional investor which does not participate in the corporate governance process may be taking insufficient
interest in the financial integrity and performance of its investment.”54
In the years that followed, the SEC sporadically mentioned fiduciary duties in connection with institutional voting generally, and mutual
fund voting in particular.55 Finally, in 2003, the SEC promulgated rules
under the ICA and IAA requiring that funds develop and publicize their
policies for voting portfolio company shares.56 In the implementing release, the SEC reiterated that “The duty of care requires an adviser with
proxy voting authority to monitor corporate events and to vote the proxies. To satisfy its duty of loyalty, the adviser must cast the proxy votes in
a manner consistent with the best interest of its client and must not subrogate client interests to its own.”57
During the same period, the Department of Labor (which oversees ERISA) also became increasingly concerned about voting of stock
held in ERISA-regulated benefit plans,58 culminating in a 1994 interpretive bulletin clarifying that the “fiduciary obligations of prudence and
loyalty . . . require the responsible fiduciary to vote proxies on issues that
53

Id.

54

Id.

Paul R. Carey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Investment
Company Institute Procedures Conference (Dec. 9, 1999) (transcript available at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1999/spch335.htm); Joann S. Lublin, Proxy Voting Is a Fiduciary Duty, SEC Chief Says in Letter to Group, WALL ST. J.
(March 21, 2002, 12:01 AM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1016665892898975640.
55

56 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-6 (2017); 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-2 (2017); Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003); Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies,
Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 2003 WL 215451 (Jan. 31, 2003).
57

Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6586 (Feb. 7, 2003).

See Letter from Alan D. Lebowitz, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Labor, to
Helmuth Fandl, Chairman of the Ret. Bd., Avon Prods., Inc. (Feb. 23, 1988), in 1988
ERISA LEXIS 19, 15 Pens. Rep. (BNA) 371, 391 (Feb. 29, 1988) (explaining that “the
decision[s] as to how proxies should be voted . . . are fiduciary acts of plan asset management.”); Lublin, supra note 55.
58
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may affect the value of the plan’s investment.”59 As a result, plans would
be expected to include written statements of proxy voting policy in their
overall investment policies.60
Both agencies were apparently motivated, at least in part, by concerns that investment advisers were voting shares in their own selfinterest, often to please corporate management that could direct banking
or pension-related business to the adviser.61 As a result, the SEC rules
place particular emphasis on conflicts between advisers and funds, requiring advisers to adopt “written policies and procedures that are reasonably designed to ensure” that securities are voted “in the best interest
of clients” and “address material conflicts that may arise between” the
interests of the adviser and its clients.62 In comments to the rule, the
SEC explained further:
An adviser’s policies and procedures under
the rule must also address how the adviser
resolves material conflicts of interest with
its clients. . . . [W]e believe that an adviser
that has a material conflict of interest with
its clients must take other steps designed to
ensure, and must be able to demonstrate
that those steps resulted in, a decision to
vote the proxies that was based on the clients’ best interest and was not the product
of the conflict.63
In adopting its rules, the SEC explicitly stated that advisers may
avoid conflicts by voting securities in accord with the recommendations

59

29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2017).

60Id.;

see also Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and
Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 FR 95879-01, 2016 WL 7453352 (providing updated guidance).
61

Lublin, supra note 55; Taub, supra note 10.

62

17 CFR 275.206(4)-6(a) (2017).

63

Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 (Feb. 7, 2003).
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of an independent third party.64 Such third parties, the SEC later advised, might include certain proxy advisory firms—companies that specialize in analyzing proxy materials and advising institutions as to how to
vote their shares to promote long-term value65—so long as the firm was
properly vetted for its own conflicts. 66
At the same time, both the SEC and DOL have made clear that
funds need not cast votes in every election on every issue proposed by
portfolio companies; instead, advisers should perform a cost-benefit
analysis to determine whether the effort involved in researching the issue
exceeds the potential value to the fund of casting an informed vote.67
That said, the agencies apparently assume that for most issues involving
publicly traded stock, costs are minimal. The DOL has been explicit on
this point, explaining that professionalization of investment management
and associated economies of scale, as well as reliance on proxy advisory
firms, will make the voting process in most instances relatively inexpensive.68 Though the SEC has not articulated its views as plainly as the
DOL, it appears to operate under the same assumption. Both of the
SEC’s 2003 releases cited the DOL’s 1994 bulletin,69 and the SEC of64

Id.

Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 889–90 (2007); Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance is Made: The Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 649, 672–73 (2016).
65

Egan-Jones Proxy Services No-Action Letter (May 27, 2004), https://www.sec.gov
/divisions/investment/noaction/egan052704.htm.
66

Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 (Feb. 7, 2003); 29
C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (2017); Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder
Rights and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies
or Guidelines, 81 FR 95879-01, 2016 WL 7453352; Paul R. Carey, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the Investment Company Institute Procedures Conference
(Dec. 9, 1999) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/news/speech
/speecharchive/1999/spch335.htm).
67

Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written
Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 FR
95879-01, 2016 WL 7453352.
68

Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 (Feb. 7, 2003); Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management
69
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fered the same example as the DOL—voting securities of a foreign
company—as a scenario in which a vote may not be cost-justified.70
Moreover, as described above, the SEC, like the DOL, has blessed the
use of proxy advisory firms.
Partially in response to the new federal requirements, most asset
managers have created centralized governance offices that handle the
voting and engagement functions for all of the funds, or clusters of
funds, administered by the manager.71 These offices articulate a general
set of corporate governance preferences that guide all proxy voting
across the funds. For example, asset managers might declare a general
preference for destaggering boards,72 proxy access under certain conditions,73 and opposition to directors who ignore successful shareholder
proposals.74 As a result, funds administered as part of a single family
tend to vote their shares as a block.75 In some cases, funds may simply
Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No.
47,304, Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922, 2003 WL 215451 (Jan. 31, 2003).
Compare Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585, 6587 n. 18 (Feb. 7,
2003), with 29 C.F.R. § 2509.94-2 (1994), and Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written Statements of Investment Policy, Including
Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 FR 95879-01, 2016 WL 7453352.
70

See, e.g., Vanguard, Statement of Additional Information, (April 27, 2017),
http://www.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/sai040.pdf (describing Vanguard’s Proxy Oversight Committee); BlackRock, BlackRock Investment Stewardship (July 2017),
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-be/literature/publication/blk-profile-ofblackrock-investment-stewardship-team-work.pdf (describing Blackrock’s voting procedures).
71

BlackRock, Proxy voting guidelines for U.S. securities (Feb. 2015), https://www.
blackrock.com/corporate/en-kr/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsible-investment-guidelines-us.pdf; Fidelity, Fidelity Funds’ Proxy Voting Guidelines (Jan. 2017), https://
www.fidelity.com/bin-public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/Full-Proxy-VotingGuidelines-for-Fidelity-Funds-Advised-by-FMRCo.pdf.
72

BlackRock, Proxy voting guidelines for U.S. securities (Feb. 2015); Fidelity, Fidelity Funds’
Proxy Voting Guidelines (Jan. 2017).
73

BlackRock, Proxy voting guidelines for U.S. securities (Feb. 2015); Fidelity, Fidelity Funds’
Proxy Voting Guidelines (Jan. 2017).
74

75

at

Scott Hirst, Social Responsibility Resolutions, J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript
11–13), https://pcg.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Scott-Hirst-
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outsource their voting function to proxy advisor services, like ISS, and
vote in accordance with their recommendations.76 Even when votes are
handled by individual fund portfolio managers—such as transaction-

Social-Responsibility-Resolutions.pdf; Rasha Ashraf et al., Do Pension-Related Business Ties
Influence Mutual Fund Proxy Voting? Evidence from Shareholder Proposals on Executive Compensation, 47 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 567, 578 (2012) (“In our sample, over 90% of votes
by fund families exhibit unanimity among the funds within the family.”); Stephen Choi
et al., Who Calls the Shots? How Mutual Funds Vote on Director Elections, 3 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 35 (2013) (finding it common for large fund families to vote either as a block, or
in clusters, often traced to common subadvisors); Vanguard, Statement of Additional Information, B-47 (April 27, 2017) http://www.vanguard.com /pub/Pdf/sai040.pdf (“For
most proxy proposals, particularly those involving corporate governance, the evaluation
will result in the same position being taken across all of the funds and the funds voting
as a block,” though with the caveat that some votes may require individuation.); Palmiter, supra note 15 (describing Fidelity and Vanguard); Burton Rothberg & Steven
Lilien, Mutual Funds and Proxy Voting: New Evidence on Corporate Governance, 1 J. BUS. &
TECH. L. 157 (2006); Angela Morgan et al., Mutual Funds as Monitors: Evidence from Mutual
Fund Voting, 17 J. CORP. FIN. 914 (2011); Jan Fichtner et al., Hidden Power of the Big Three?
Passive Index Funds, Re-concentration of Corporate Ownership and New Financial Risk, 19 BUS.
& POL. 298 (2017); Ying Duan & Yawen Jiao, The Role of Mutual Funds in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Mutual Funds’ Proxy Voting and Trading Behavior, 51 J. FIN. & QUANT.
ANAL. 489 (2016); Susanne Craig, The Giant of Shareholders, Quietly Stirring, N.Y. TIMES,
May 18, 2013, at BU1 (describing how centralized governance analysts decide how to
vote fund shares). There are, of course, exceptions; for example, in the recent proxy
battle at P&G, some individual BlackRock funds voted differently than the rest of the
family. See Sharon Terlep & David Benoit, P&G Says Trian’s Nelson Peltz Has Lost Bid
for Board Seat; He Disagrees, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 10, 2017, 8:57 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/ articles/p-g-board-vote-comes-down-to-the-wire-1507629601.
Choi, supra note 75 (finding that pure reliance on an advisory service is more common among the smaller families); Duan & Jiao, supra note 75.
76
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specific votes on mergers77—funds within a family often coordinate their
voting.78
Since the rules were put in place, the SEC has continued to focus
on potential conflicts of interest between the asset manager and investors in the fund. For example, the SEC settled an action against an investment adviser that voted all of its clients’ shares in accord with AFLCIO guidelines in order to win union pension business.79 The SEC has
also expressed concern about proxy advisory firms that offer conflicted
advice.80 Yet despite funds’ open practice of centralizing votes, little heed
has been paid to the potential for interclient conflicts, that is, conflicts between the interests of different funds.

Patrick Jahnke, How Institutional Investors’ Ownership Concentration Affects Corporate Governance, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG, (Sept. 22, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law
.columbia.edu/2017/09/22/how-institutional-investors-ownership-concentrationaffects-corporate-governance/ (Within fund families, votes on “votes on capital increases or takeovers and other major corporate actions” may be handled by portfolio
managers; other voting decisions are centralized.); In re CNX Gas Corp. S’holders Litig.,
4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010) (describing fund managers’ involvement with decisions regarding how to respond to a tender offer).
77

See Andriy Bodnaruk & Marco Rossi, Dual Ownership, Returns, and Voting in Mergers,
120 J. FIN. ECON. 58 (2016); Hortense Bioy et al., Morningstar Manager Research, Passive Fund Providers Take an Active Approach to Investment Stewardship 11, 14 (Dec. 2017).
78

In re Intech Inv. Mgmt. LLC & David E. Hurley Respondents, Investment Advisors
Act of 1940 Release No. IA-2872, 95 SEC Docket 2265, 2009 WL 1271173 (May 7,
2009).
79

80 Egan-Jones Proxy Services No-Action Letter (May 27, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/
divisions/investment/noaction/egan052704.htm; Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy
System, Exchange Act Release No. 62495, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3052,
Investment Company Act Release No. 29340, 2010 WL 2779423 (July 14, 2010). The
SEC’s efforts have apparently been only somewhat successful; there is, for example,
substantial evidence that fund advisers who seek business administering retirement
plans will vote clients’ shares so as to curry favor with corporate management. Taub,
supra note 10; Gerald F. Davis & E. Han Kim, Business Ties and Proxy Voting by Mutual
Funds, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 552 (2007); David J. Pedersen, All Tied Up in Knots: The Complex
Relationship between Bidders and their 401(k) Trustees, (May 22, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2972099; Choi, supra note 75; Ashraf, supra note 75.
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In the most obvious examples, one fund may hold shares of a
potential acquiring firm while another holds shares of the target. The
funds’ interests are opposed, yet evidence suggests that fund managers
behave as though all of the funds are part of a single portfolio, and seek
to maximize wealth across the entire fund family, rather than at a specific
fund.81 Similarly, when fund families hold both equity and debt of a single firm, they may vote the stock with a view to shoring up the value of
the debt, even if the stock and debt are held by different funds.82 There
is even evidence that fund families that own stock in competing firms
prefer compensation packages that reward wealth maximization across
the industry, without regard for whether particular funds have more or
less of an interest in specific companies.83
These practices were on display in the tender offer context in In
re CNX Gas Corporation.84 One T. Rowe Price fund held shares in both a
potential acquirer and its target company, while another held shares in
the target alone. Despite the funds’ differing interests, T. Rowe Price
negotiated a price for the target stock on behalf of all of its funds, simultaneously.85
Funds are often asked to vote on governance matters, such as
destaggering a board or granting proxy access to shareholders.86 AlternaGregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-Ownership, Returns, and Voting in Mergers,
89 J. Fin. Econ. 391 (2008) (analyzing cross-ownership at the conglomerate level); Chris
Brooks et al., Institutional Cross-ownership and Corporate Strategy: The Case of Mergers and Acquisitions, (Dec. 21, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2747036 (same); Maria Goranova et al., Owners on Both Sides of the Deal: Mergers and Acquisitions and Overlapping Institutional Ownership, 31 Strat. Mgmt. J. 1114 (2010) (same).
81

82

Bodnaruk & Rossi, supra note 78.

Miguel Anton et al., Common Ownership, Competition, and Top Management Incentives (Ross
Sch. of Bus., Working Paper No. 1328, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2802332.
83

84

4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010).

85

Id. at 402.

Gibson Dunn, Shareholder Proposal Developments During the 2017 Proxy Season, (June 29,
2017), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/Shareholder-ProposalDevelopments-During-the-2017-Proxy-Season.pdf.
86
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tively, they may be asked to support or reject director nominees from a
dissenting shareholder, typically advocating for immediate cost-cutting
and a return of cash to shareholders.87 These are matters on which funds
may reasonably differ, depending on their investment strategies. Actively
managed funds with high turnover may prefer immediate financial engineering measures that boost stock prices88; funds that specialize in companies that expect growth, or rely on research and development, may
prefer to keep antitakeover measures in place.89 But centralized voting
policies do not draw such distinctions.
Thus, the issues raised by centralized voting are not limited to the
usual critique that proxy advisors or institutional investors adopt a “onesize-fits-all” approach to corporate governance that fails to allow for
flexibility at individual portfolio companies.90 Though specific compaJohn C. Coffee, Jr & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 580–81 (2016).
87

Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV.
561, 579–80 (2006). Short-term investors may therefore prefer executive pay packages
that reward short-term measures over longer term investment. Cf. Alex Edmans et al.,
The Long-Term Consequences of Short-Term Incentives, (Oct. 28, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3037354 (describing how CEO incentives
may induce measures that result in short-term stock price increases at the expense over
long-term performance).
88

Robert Daines et al., Can Staggered Boards Improve Value? Evidence from the Massachusetts
Natural Experiment, (March 2017) http://ssrn.com/ abstract=2836463 (concluding that
staggered boards contribute to value at earlier-stage firms); Martijn Cremers et al., Staggered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, (July 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=2364165 (concluding that staggered boards may add
value at firms that rely on research and innovation); Martijn Cremers et al., Shadow Pills
and Long-Term Firm Value, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3074658. But see Emiliano Catan & Michael Klausner, Board Declassification and Firm
Value: Have Shareholders and Boards Really Destroyed Billions in Value?, (Sept. 2017),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2994559 (concluding that board
destaggering does not reduce value at firms with high research and development expenditures).
89

See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 906 (2007); Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, Exchange Act Release No. 62495, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3052, Investment Company Act Release No. 29340, 2010 WL
2779423 (July 14, 2010).
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nies might benefit from idiosyncratic governance approaches, it might
still be appropriate for funds to adopt general sets of governance preferences if, on average, those preferences make sense for most companies
in which it invests, and further company-specific research would not
yield additional benefits. The problem, from the perspective of mutual
fund investors, arises when centralized voting practices fail to draw appropriate distinctions at the fund level.
In other words, though an institutional investor (or a fund) with
a variety of holdings might reasonably adopt a uniform set of preferences
with respect corporate governance, the optimal set of preferences might
vary from fund to fund depending on its particular investment strategy.
However, the current practice within fund families is to elide these differences through centralized and coordinated voting and engagement.91
IV. DOES CENTRALIZED VOTING VIOLATE FUNDS’ DUTIES TO
INVESTORS?

A. Fiduciary Obligations and Conflicts of Duty
Under traditional common law, from which federal standards are
drawn, fiduciaries are prohibited not only from acting out of selfinterest, but also from even accepting engagements from persons whose
interests conflict.93 As the Restatement (Second) of Agency puts it, “an agent
is subject to a duty not to act or to agree to act during the period of his
agency for persons whose interests conflict with those of the principal in
92

Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite? A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge
Fund Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1913–14
(2017) (indexed funds and active funds may vote identically within a complex). But see
Choi, supra note 75 (pointing out that within the Fidelity family of mutual funds, active
funds and indexed funds are managed separately, and do not vote together).
91

Staff Report; Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Structure of Investment Management Regulation, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MUTUAL FUNDS (John D. Morley & William A. Birdthistle,
eds.) (Elgar Publishing, forthcoming); see also Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335
(2010) (interpreting federal duties of mutual fund directors in light of trust principles).
92

Andrew F. Tuch, The Weakening of Fiduciary Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MUFUNDS (John D. Morley & William A. Birdthistle, eds.) (Elgar Publishing, forthcoming); Arthur R. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54 AM. U. L.
REV. 75, 81 (2005).
93
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matters in which the agent is employed.”94 In modern financial conglomerates, however—including the mutual fund industry—this rule has
long been abandoned.95 Courts instead have endorsed the practice of
partitioning, allowing businesses to serve clients with competing interests
so long as there are informational and other barriers among the agents
who handle those accounts.96 It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the
Restatement (Third) of Agency no longer contains the blanket prohibition of
the Restatement (Second) of Agency.
Still, the Restatement (Third) of Agency continues to forbid agents
from “us[ing] the property of the principal for . . . [the purposes] of a
third party.”97 Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts requires that trustees not “be influenced by the interest of any third person or by motives
other than the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust” in administering trust assets.98 The Restatement (Third) of Trusts does recognize that,
in some instances, a trust has multiple beneficiaries, necessitating that the
trustee balance their competing interests (while displaying impartiality
among them).99 Such a situation might be analogized to the types of resource-based conflicts encountered by fund sponsors who must decide
how to allocate personnel and scarce opportunities among funds (recognizing that these conflicts exist because sponsors voluntarily assume conflicting obligations, which would be forbidden under traditional principles).100 Voting, however, is not like these other conflicts, because it is
not a limited resource; centralization, let alone the use of one fund’s
votes to benefit holdings in another fund, is not an inescapable aspect of
the business model. Thus, an application of these principles would bar
94

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 394.

95

Tuch, supra note 93.

96

Id.

97

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.05.

Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78 cmt. f.; see also Restatement (Third) of Agency
§ 8.05 cmt. b (trustees must exhibit “undivided loyalty” to beneficiaries, and act “solely
in the interest of the beneficiary in matters of trust administration”).
98

99

Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 90 cmt. c.

100

Laby, supra note 93, at 92–93.
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advisers from using the votes of one fund to enhance the value of a different fund.101
Moreover, the duty of care requires that advisers “exercise the
judgment and care that a prudent person would exercise in the management of his or her own affairs.”102 Centralization may result from a kind
of short-cut on governance matters that may not satisfy the needs of particular funds; that practice, as well, would seem to violate asset managers’
duties to the funds they sponsor.103
But matters are not quite so straightforward.
First, from a regulatory standpoint, both the SEC and the DOL
have appeared to approve, if not encourage, centralized voting in general,
and outsourcing to proxy advisory services in particular. The SEC has
explained that the use of a “pre-determined voting policy” or the “recommendations of an independent third party” are permissible mechanisms for avoiding conflicts between an adviser and its client.104 To be
sure, these policies and recommendations could be fund-specific—as the
SEC put it, “[n]othing in the rule prevents an adviser from having differMutual funds organized as trusts differ from ordinary trusts, in that they have no
donor/settlor and thus are more contractual. See Northstar Financial Advisors Inc. v.
Schwab Investments, 779 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 2015). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
has held that traditional trust law provides the most appropriate analogy. See Jones v.
Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010). See also Tuch, supra note 93 (investment advisers are subject to fiduciary duties of the common law of trusts); Palmiter, supra note 15,
at 1466 (same).
101

Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 90 (“The trustee has a duty to the beneficiaries to
invest and manage the funds of the trust as a prudent investor would, in light of the
purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust”).

102

103 For example, passive investment managers that control funds with holdings of both
an acquirer and target may simply vote all target shares in favor of a merger, and all
acquirer shares against the merger, ignoring the needs of particular funds. As the current Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine, put it, “This is, of
course, incoherent, stupid, and reflective of a lack of judgment being exercised by the
index fund on behalf of its specific investors and their interests.” Leo E. Strine, J., Securing Our Nation’s Economic Future: A Sensible, Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase Long-Term
Investment and Job Creation in the United States, 71 BUS. L. 1081, 1093 (2016).
104

Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003).
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ent policies and procedures for different clients”105—but that phrasing
itself suggests something of a one-size-fits-all default.
Additionally, both the SEC and the DOL have stressed that
funds need not vote their shares if the costs of researching an issue outweigh the benefits to the fund of voting. Since each individual fund may
only benefit from its votes to a very small degree, many votes are unlikely to be cost-justified without centralization.106 This point was acknowledged by the DOL which, as described above, explicitly stated that the
professionalization of investment advice, coupled with the use of proxy
advisor services, renders voting inexpensive enough to justify the cost.
The SEC has also emphasized the positive externalities associated with careful voting by mutual funds due to their “increased equity
holdings and accompanying voting power.” That voting power, according to the SEC, “place[s] them in a position to have enormous influence
on corporate accountability. As major shareholders, mutual funds may
play a vital role in monitoring the stewardship of the companies in which
they invest.”107 But this voting power is only present when an asset
manager like BlackRock or Fidelity votes its funds in a uniform manner;
viewed fund-by-fund, each institution is far less powerful and far less
likely to individually assert much of an influence on governance. Thus,
in this passage, the SEC once again implicitly assumes that fund shares
will be voted en masse.
In sum, the SEC has sent somewhat mixed messages. Despite
generally endorsing broad common law standards of fiduciary conduct,
in practice, the SEC appears to tolerate something quite different.

105

Id.

106 See Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822, 1830–32 (2011).

Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 8188, 2003
WL 215451 (Jan. 31, 2003).
107
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B. The Role of Consent
These conflicting signals might be reconciled if we view funds’
voting arrangements through the lens of consent. In general, both
common law and the federal regulatory scheme permit clients to consent
to managerial conflicts upon full disclosure. For example, the Restatement
(Third) of Agency permits an agent to act for more than one principal so
long as the agent deals in good faith and discloses all relevant facts.108
Similarly, the SEC has stated that “an adviser’s policy of disclosing [any]
conflict to clients and obtaining their consents before voting satisfies the
requirements of the rule.”109 In the context of mutual funds, we may
reasonably question whether retail investors can provide autonomous
consent, but there is an alternative: the SEC has stated that the directors
are empowered to consent to actions that might otherwise present a conflict.110
There are certainly plausible reasons for why a mutual fund
board might consent to centralization of voting policies, despite the conflicts they present. By coordinating votes across funds, fund families increase their leverage with portfolio companies, thus enabling them to
more effectively advocate for better governance.111 This kind of cooperation among funds may ultimately represent the most profitable arrangement for investors, even if each fund occasionally makes small sacrifices on individual matters. Funds may also share the view that a single
set of governance policies broadly suit the market as a whole, even if
they are suboptimal in particular cases, and that therefore it benefits all
of the funds to seek market-wide standardization. Standardization may
also carry its own benefits, by permitting investors to focus on the substance of businesses when evaluating firms, sparing them the need to
investigate and price varying governance arrangements. The resulting

108

Restatement (Third) of Agency § 8.06.

109

Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 6585 (Feb. 7, 2003)

110

Id. at n.20.

111

Palmiter, supra note 15, at 1465.
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reduced transaction costs and increased liquidity may counterbalance any
efficiency losses at outlier firms.112
The difficulty is that this hypothetical consent remains just that.
Though we may assume that fund directors are aware of—and perhaps
have acquiesced—to the sponsor’s publicly announced approach to governance issues, it is not obvious that every board has evaluated centralized voting strategy with the “high degree of rigor and skeptical objectivity”113 that their role demands. Though both the full board, and the
independent directors, are required to conduct an annual review of their
advisory contracts,114 typically the focus of these reviews is on such matters as the fund’s financial performance, the size of the fee and the adviser’s profits, and adviser conflicts of interests115; there is little reason to
believe much attention is paid to problems created by voting coordination specifically.116
V. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

If fund boards and investment advisers are, in fact, neglecting
their fiduciary duties by centralizing their voting and engagement without
appropriate consideration, fund investors might seek to remedy the situaMichael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV.
757, 762 (1995); Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration Clauses in
Corporate Charters and Bylaws, 104 GEO. L.J. 583, 619 (2016).

112

Investment Company Governance, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,520,
83 SEC Docket 1384 (July 27, 2004) (quoting Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature
of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L. J. 797, 798 (2001)).

113

114

15 U.S.C. § 80a-15.

115

ABA Business Law Section, Fund Director’s Guidebook 45 (4th ed. 2015).

The ABA Fund Director’s Guidebook does not even mention proxy voting policy as an
aspect of board review. See id. at 45–51; see also id. at 69–94 (describing director oversight responsibilities; no mention of voting policy). Cf. John Morley & Quinn Curtis,
Taking Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds,
120 Yale L.J. 84, 95 (2010) (observing that advisory contracts “are generally only two or
three pages long and specify very little about strategy”). Significantly, Alan Palmiter,
writing in 2002—before the SEC promulgated its proxy voting rules—also observed
that the then-current edition of the ABA Fund Director Guidebook did not discuss
voting policy. See Palmiter, supra note 15, at 1466.
116
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tion by filing lawsuits for breach of fiduciary duty. However, shareholders’ private rights of action in the mutual fund context are quite limited.117 Moreover, it would be difficult if not impossible for investors to
establish any concrete, tangible damages to the fund as a result of its voting policy; the most appropriate remedy would be an injunction directing
fund boards and investment advisers to reform their voting practices.
Given the widespread practice of voting centralization, and the SEC’s
expertise in developing industry-wide rules, a more promising path forward would be for the SEC to undertake a rulemaking that more precisely specifies the duties of the board and the investment advisor. Below, I
outline how the SEC might approach that task.
Ordinarily, the SEC requires that contracts between funds that
share an investment adviser be in the best interests of both parties. For
example, according to the SEC, the duty of loyalty requires that “an investment adviser . . . not cause funds to enter into a 17a-7 transaction
unless doing so would be in the best interests of each fund participating in the
transaction.”118 When it comes to mutual fund voting, however, such
strict equivalence may not be feasible; funds may reasonably cooperate
by casting votes reciprocally.
A more appropriate comparison might be drawn to joint distribution arrangements. Sponsors often use mutual funds’ own assets to
market shares to new investors, in a practice that is permitted—but regu-

Investors might bring claims under state law. See Strougo v. Bassini, 282 F.3d 162
(2d Cir. 2002). Alternatively, federal law offers a limited right of action for excessive
fees, see Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010), or to void contracts whose
formation or performance violates the Investment Advisers Act. See Transamerica
Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 24 (1979). Frequently such actions must be
brought derivatively, with all of the procedural barriers that follow. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Private Litigation To Enforce Fiduciary Duties in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits,
Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1025–26
(2005).
117

Federated Municipal Funds, SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 3421853 (Nov. 20,
2006) (emphasis added). Similarly, when funds purchase joint liability insurance, the
directors of each fund must determine that the contract is in its best interests. See 17
C.F.R. § 270.17d-1(d)(7).
118
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lated by—the SEC.119 Though the SEC prohibits affiliated funds from
coordinating their marketing in a single plan,120 sponsors may apply for
relief from the restriction on a case-by-case basis.121 In considering a
proposed plan, the SEC does not require “absolute equality among the
participants” or a precise apportionment of costs relative to the benefits
for each fund,122 but does require that each fund board make an individualized, fund-specific determination that the arrangement falls within a
“reasonable range of fairness” that will redound to the fund’s benefit.123
In so concluding, the board may consider intangible benefits to the fund,
such as those that flow from economies of scale, and that arise from enhancing the attractiveness of the fund complex as a whole.124 At one
point, the SEC even considered adopting a formal rule that would permit
joint distribution arrangements so long as the plan was approved by independent directors who concluded that the plan both benefitted the
fund, and did not place it at a disadvantage relative to other participating
funds.125

119

17 C.F.R. 270.12b-1.

120

17 C.F.R. 270.17d-3.

Mutual Fund Distribution Fees; Confirmations, SEC Proposed Rule, 2010 WL
11248712 (July 21, 2010) (“any joint arrangement between funds that implicates section
17(d) and rule 17d-1 would require the funds to apply for and obtain an exemption
from the Commission prior to implementing the arrangement”).

121

In re Vanguard Group, Investment Company Act Release No. 11645, 1981 WL
749192 (Feb. 25, 2981).
122

Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16431, 1988 WL 1706824
(June 10, 1988),.

123

See In re Vanguard Group, Investment Company Act Release No. 11645, 1981 WL
749192 (Feb. 25, 2981); Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by Registered Open-End
Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16431,
1988 WL 1706824 (June 10, 1988).
124

See Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16431, 1988 WL 1706824
(June 10, 1988).
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Centralized voting policies could follow a similar model. Independent directors would be expected to scrutinize such arrangements,
and make fund-by-fund determinations whether, based on the fund’s
investment strategy as compared to the governance preferences expressed by the sponsor, participating in the arrangement would be in the
fund’s best interests. If they conclude that the fund’s interests differ
from those of other funds in the complex, they should insist that the
fund vote its shares independently.
Consent to a conflict, however, is only effective if “it is specific
and is given with knowledge of material facts.”126 In the context of joint
distribution arrangements, for example, the SEC’s proposed rule would
only have granted blanket permission if the specifics of the arrangement
were detailed in advance, presumably so that each fund board would be
fully informed.127 When it comes to voting and engagement, fund boards
may be aware of the “material facts” with respect to generalized corporate governance policies, but they would need transaction-specific information to consent to coordinated voting and engagement on issues like
mergers or company-specific resolutions. Presumably, the benefits and
drawbacks of centralization on these types of votes are dependent on the
particular factors involved, including an assessment of whether the fund
is sacrificing more—in lost merger compensation, from lack of vigorous
competition—than it is gaining through cooperation with sibling funds.
Thus, for these matters, informed consent might require case-by-case
board consideration.
In an alternative model, asset managers might alter their structure
so that governance research is centralized, but actual voting determinaDeborah A. DeMott, Forum-Selection Bylaws Refracted Through an Agency Lens, 57 ARIZ.
L. REV. 269, 282 (2015); see also Proxy Voting by Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg.
6585, n.21 (Feb. 7, 2003) (“An adviser seeking a client’s consent must provide the client
with sufficient information regarding the matter before shareholders and the nature of
the adviser’s conflict to enable the client to make an informed decision to consent to
the adviser’s vote. Boilerplate disclosure in a client brochure regarding generalized conflicts would be inadequate.”).
126

See Payment of Asset-Based Sales Loads by Registered Open-End Management Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 16431, 1988 WL 1706824
(June 10, 1988).
127
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tions are made at the fund level. That way, the family might avoid costly
and duplicative determinations regarding the likely effects/outcomes of
particular proposals, while allowing each fund to judge for itself what
policies are likely to benefit that particular fund. To the extent that the
actual voting decisions are not made by the board, but by portfolio managers—who are more informed than directors, but also employed by and
beholden to the sponsoring company—procedures akin to those used
for cross-client trades might be appropriate. Voting decisions and analysis could be documented, along with a description of how the votes impacted other related funds, and presented to each board on a quarterly
basis for its review and approval by the independent directors.128
Certainly, these proposals are far from ideal. One major issue
concerns the heavy reliance placed on fund independent directors. As
described above, even statutorily independent directors may serve on
tens or hundreds of boards within a complex, raising questions about
both their loyalties and their attention. However, nominally independent
boards are central to the entire system of mutual fund compliance129; if
they are inadequate to the task, the issues go far beyond voting policy.
More fundamentally, these procedures would come with a price.
Additional demands on the time and attention of fund boards might ultimately increase costs to the funds themselves, even to the point where
the votes would no longer be cost-justified.130 If so, then, as the SEC has
acknowledged, the prudent course may be for funds not to vote at all.
This alternative, however, would be better for fund investors than for
Compare 17 CFR 270.17a-7, with 17 CFR 275.206(3)-2, and SEC Staff No Action Letter to Independent Directors Council (Nov. 2, 2010), https://www.sec.gov
/divisions/investment/noaction/2010/idc-mfdf110210.pdf (requiring that boards conduct quarterly reviews of affiliated transactions; boards may “tap …relevant expertise”
to assist with the effort, including counsel and fund personnel).
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Costs may be justified for some funds in the complex, but not others. Active funds,
for example, may collect more information about the securities they trade than passive
funds, making it easier for directors of those funds to make informed decisions about
voting policy. Cf. Dorothy Shapiro Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting
(forthcoming in Journal of Corporation Law), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2992046.
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funds to cast suboptimal votes to shore up other funds—particularly as
there will always be concerns that the ultimate beneficiaries of such votes
will be funds that charge higher fees and thus generate more profits for
the sponsor.
VI. CONCLUSION

Though the SEC has exhibited concern about investment advisers who use fund votes as currency to advance their own interests, it has
paid less attention to the problems of interfund conflict. As a result,
there is reason to believe that fund managers do not seek to maximize
value at particular funds, but instead seek to maximize value across the
entire fund complex. Though this might be a reasonable choice that
benefits investors, it is not clear that the matter has received serious consideration. Whether due to regulation or on their own initiative, fund
boards should make reasoned choices about the extent to which particular funds benefit from participating in a cooperative voting scheme with
their sibling funds.
More focused attention to conflicts in voting policy—both at the
regulatory level, and the fund board level—may also have a salutary effect on portfolio company management. In recent years, scholars have
raised concerns that mutual funds’ voting power distorts corporate policy. For example, mutual fund managers may pressure portfolio companies to achieve short-term stock price boosts at the expense of investments that would yield longer-term gains.131 Index fund managers may
be relatively uninformed about portfolio companies and make poor governance decisions when voting or engaging with management.132 In one
of the more explosive charges, it has been suggested that because fund
families hold stock in multiple competing firms across their portfolios,
they may encourage firms within an industry to cooperate with each other rather than compete, potentially running afoul of the spirit, and possibly the letter, of antitrust laws.133 These and many other concerns about
131 See David Millon, Looking Back, Looking Forward: Personal Reflections on a Scholarly Career, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699, 729 (2017).
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the power of mutual funds have led to a variety of proposals for dramatic corporate governance reforms, including eliminating voting rights
for passive investors,134 and regulating the investment policies of mutual
fund families.135 Assuming these scholars are correct, the premise of the
argument is that fund families act as a block. If a more precise articulation of fiduciary duties forced less coordination within the family itself,
some of these concerns might be alleviated, without the need for upheavals of other aspects of the corporate legal regime.

HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016); Eric A. Posner, et al., A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive
Power of Institutional Investors, https://ssrn.com/abstract =2872754; Fiona M. Scott Morton & Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Horizontal Shareholding and Antitrust Policy,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3046203.
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